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The Commission's state aid control: All bark, no
bite? In fact, more than enough money has already been spent on keeping Alitalia in its current sorry state, and from a purely utilitarian viewpoint the doubts expressed by the Commission are justified indeed. However, in this regard our experience with the Commission has not really been encouraging. Formal investigations of cases of state aid are started far too rarely and even scarcer are cases when a conclusive decision is reached. Apparently, controlling influential European governments is more difficult than bullying American companies. The problem does not seem to be in the lack of formal powers of the
Commission to step in and impose fines. The competences of DG-Competition
are many and significant. Rather, the problem is related to the fact that
to risk an open conflict with the French, the Italian or the German government
is too costly for European bureaucrats who might have not lost their political
ambitions in their respective home countries. Thus, unless a fundamental
change occurs in the incentive structure of European civil service, it
is difficult to expect the EC to have teeth. And even imagining such structure
without speaking about whether it is realisable or not is
extremely difficult. Is CAP here to stay, indefinitely? For this reason, no one has been able to stand up openly against the
massive programme of agriculture subsidies run by the European Union.
The modest efforts to start discussions about reform of fiscal matters
within the EU are most often derailed, postponed or they end in a very
vague and uncertain manner. Every excuse is good for not taking the hard
decisions now but only in the distant future. Recently, the Constitutional
Treaty has served as such
an excuse. The long overdue reform of the EU budget has been delayed
again until the Treaty is ratified in Ireland and the UK (Ireland being
an important net benefactor of the CAP). If there is any reform at all,
it will not affect EU expenses until 2014. And by then, there will clearly
be new, more urgent matters to attend to, postponing thus an effective
reform beyond many of our lifespans. Against a European tax base We should recognise that these gains are likely to be extremely small,
for they are mostly informational and are do not involve any kind of risk
uncertainty (contrary to, e.g., costs of switching currencies across different
European countries and the exchange rate risk which existed prior to the
introduction of the Euro). These rather small benefits should be compared
to the potential cost of harmonisation. Both the French and the Commission
deny that their ultimate goal is a harmonisation of corporate taxes across
the continent. Maybe they are telling the truth but maybe they are not.
Once the tax base is harmonised within the EU, it will extremely easy
to impose a common European corporate income tax. Whether the French government
or the Commission intends to do it now or not is completely immaterial
with regard to the fact that the incentives to do it will be strong. And
in the real world, bad incentives usually matter more than good intentions. "Open Skies" deal or unilateral liberalisation?
This example offers also a question that libertarians should reflect
upon very intensely. Usually, we tend to be sceptical of deals such as
this one. We are very quick to emphasise that a unilateral liberalisation
done a decade ago would have been preferable. This might be true or not
but it misses the fundamental point: that unilateral liberalisation is
usually not a feasible option, given the asymmetry between dispersed benefits
and concentrated costs that it would entail. In such situations, clumsy
bargaining and imperfect intergovernmental deals, overcoming the influence
of pressure groups (or buying them off) might be the best solution that
we can hope for. It does sound depressing but it might still be an accurate
picture of the reality of democratic politics. Same Lisbon Agenda, Different Day In view of the utter failure of the initial ambitions of the Lisbon Agenda, European politicians are now trying to reshape it in way which would stress its social and ecological elements. No more does Europe aspire to be the most dynamic economy in the world. Now, its primary objective is to tackle the climate change and to eliminate "social exclusion." Two years of consecutive growth do not mean that Europe's economic problems
are nonexistent. On the contrary, in spite of encouraging economic performance
in recent years, the unsustainability of the welfare state in face of
demographic changes looms on the horizon. It is striking that the politicians
refuse to face and prefer to live in a world of illusory plans, agendas
and strategies. Will Sweden be rallying Europe's free marketeers?
On Monday, Swedish trade minister Ewa Bjorling announced that she would attempt to rally free trade forces within the EU in order to stop the protectionist policies promoted mainly by the French. So far, the governments of Britain, Germany, Denmark, Finland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have expressed their support of the idea. Needless to say, the sympathies of yours truly are with the free traders. Still, there must be something awfully wrong with the rest of Europe when Sweden - reputed for its onerous taxation and regulation - is heading the movement for liberation of our foreign trade. In any event, the problems with free markets within the EU go deeper
than just the occasional excesses of Nicolas Sarkozy. Not only is the
EU clearly not a free trader with regard to the outside world, its regulations
and unwillingness to carry on the principles of free movement of labour
and services to their logical consequences make it also a hostile environment
for free markets. Anti-Dumping and Interest Groups The main beneficiaries of the measure are Italian compressor producers. Curiously enough, we have witnessed a prime example of log-rolling taking place within the Commission, as a coalition of French, Italian and German Commissioners pushed forward the measure in spite of Mr Mandelson's protests. At least we know how the Italians will vote when, next time, the profits of some French or German companies will be at stake. Anti-dumping tariffs may work in a textbook model of international trade,
which takes the existence of a perfectly functioning public sector for
granted. But in a world in which particular interests can exercise influence
even over members of the EC, anti-dumping tariffs are doomed to be a bad
and dangerous idea. Let us hope that Mr Mandelson has learned his lesson. The End of the Microsoft Saga? Now that the never-ending Microsoft story is almost over, it may be a good occasion to spend some time discussing its likely economic effects. Microsoft has been supplying innovative products in an industry in which the costs of imitating and copying are extremely low. Not all of its innovations were patented. Most of them were probably not even patentable under current statutes. This being said, the only way how Microsoft could have made money from its costly research and development was not to show how rabbits got into the hat. Were the profits which Microsoft was actually making "unreasonable"? No economist can answer this question. What is clear, however, is that by imposing these additional fines and by the messy atmosphere of the Commission's decisions and subsequent lawsuits, incentives have diminished for companies to engage in research and development which would take place at the boundary of what is technologically possible at the moment. The sceptic may well argue that we need a decent regulatory environment
to ensure that innovators do not collect unjustifiably great profits from
their inventions. He may well be right but my classical liberal instincts
tell me that such regulatory environment is impossible and that an attempt
to introduce it would result in great many undesirable and unintended
consequences. However that may be, it should be recognised that the current
arbitrariness and the coarse rules of thumb used by the Commission to
deal with an industry that it cannot fully understand are by far inferior
to simply letting Microsoft and its competitors go. Social Darwinism, Société Générale and Rent-Seeking
It is thus paradoxical that many of the real-world policies seem to be inspired by the literal reading of social Darwinism. The hysteria of the French government over the possible take-over of Société Générale by a foreign bank is an illustration of such mode of thinking. Mr Fillon is saying that he will not allow Société Générale to become a target of "hostile raids by other banking establishments." This creates an atmosphere in which a takeover by HSBC or Deutsche Bank is equated to some violent event in which the blood of many would be spilt. Nothing could be further from the truth. For an average customer of the bank as well as for an average employee a hostile takeover by some major foreign bank and a "friendly" solution, splitting Société Générale among other French financial institutions will have approximately the same consequences. Obviously, the only major difference between these two solutions is
that the latter will create significant rents. This opens the question
to which extent is the social Darwinian rhetoric a genuine misunderstanding
of the way how markets work and to which extent it is simply a self-interested
demagoguery. In any event, voters should be more sensitive whenever a
politician compares markets to the jungle, particularly when the politician
places himself in the right-wing of the political spectrum. A natural experiment on eBay Now, eBay plans to modify its feedback mechanism in a way that would prohibit sellers from leaving negative or neutral feedback about buyers. According to eBay, negative feedback from sellers was an obstacle to smooth transactions. This is an interesting natural experiment. The feedback mechanism practised
on eBay served as a way of ensuring transparency, even though it could
have been abused from time to time. Will a decrease in transparency of
transactions lead to better of worse market outcomes? My bet as
with most exogenous interventions to any market is that eBay will
function worse, and not better, than before. In any event, economists
especially those who are interested in the mechanism
design theory should be very attentive to what will happen. Free shipping on Amazon? Not in France The core of the problem is that French legislation limits discounts
on books. This is done probably with the ambition of protecting small
booksellers. How such a statute enhances competition is unclear, however.
Sometimes, people argue that such protection of small businesses helps
the book market to generate a diverse environment. We should realise though
that this apparent diversity exists only at the retail level and comes
at a high cost. While it is nice to encounter hundreds of small bookshops
that would have not existed without such protection, consumers should
know that these are not needed for a vibrant book market - just as the
existence of many mom-and-pop shops are not needed for a diverse and vibrant
market with food. The Microsoft story, continued This time, it is the Internet Explorer that seems to be a pain in the neck of Microsoft's competitors and of European regulators. The fact that it comes together with the whole Windows operating system is considered to be a violation of EU competition rules and an attempt to "control the gateway to the internet." This is ridiculous. Microsoft Windows features many small programmes
to help one to edit texts, record voice, paint, play the cards or sweep
mines. After the MediaPlayer episode, it seems that every single one of
these programmes can be subject of a lawsuit. Next time, producers of
alternative Solitaires or Minesweepers may come and accuse Microsoft of
unfair practices. In fact, all that Microsoft is doing is offering a better
and a more complex product. If one wishes to, he may always purchase the
allegedly superior media players, web browsers or mine sweepers from other
producers. To object to the fact that Microsoft is offering them as an
integral part of the Windows is like objecting to BMW's offering air conditioning
and leather seats as standard features. Picking the wrong winners Obviously, no one is disputing the competence of either of these two economists. Both of them have made substantial, albeit in some respects controversial, contributions to economic science. But what is interesting that these two are probably the two most left-leaning Nobel Laureates in the past 20 years or so. Not that there would be anything wrong with that, but by picking these two President Sarkozy sends a rather clear message about his own ideological positions. And this message might be somewhat disappointing for many a French voter, longing for a change. Furthermore, the whole project of constructing a new definition of economic
development - one that would take into account the overall quality of
life - should sound suspicious. Obviously, every one accepts that the
French way of life, of cooking, of eating and of enjoying oneself is superior
to most of the things that one may experience on this planet. We do not
need government-employed economists to tell us that. And, what is even
more disturbing, when the government-employed economists tell us something
that we already know, it may be just to mask some other and more disturbing
facts - such the fact that the President has, by and large, failed to
put forward a major reform of labour regulations and has not done much
to liberate the productive forces of the French economy. Cartels are not always a bad thing So far, no evidence has been presented in favour of the view that the air cargo companies were really practicing price-fixing. One should note, however, that in a business such as air transport and air cargo, many of the beneficial activities performed by these companies or alliances of these companies may superficially resemble the uncompetitive practices despised by the EC. Yet, it would be a mistake to try to curb those. Indeed, in industries such as telecommunications, banking or air transport, a high degree of cooperation between competitors is desirable, giving birth to what Pascal Salin aptly named 'cartels as efficient productive structures' (see pdf here). Such cartels are not really designed to rob the consumer and to eliminate competition. On the contrary, such cartels are the most efficient way of satisfying consumer's wants. To be sure, this does not mean that price-fixing practices do not exist.
They oftentimes do. But the real problem for competition policy is to
distinguish practically between the two quite different instances of cooperation
between market competitors. Such distinction is not easy to be made and
I personally would hesitate whether to rely on the EC's judgment, particularly
as the EC has a heavy stakes in showing that the arrangement in question
is really a cartel of the harmful variety. Should MasterCard be compelled to scrap its fees?
Well, noody likes to pay fees. We would all prefer if things were out there for free. But they are not. The only reasonable way of allocating resources to alternative uses is through the price mechanism. Sure, many economists would argue that there are instances when the price mechanism fails. But is there any compelling evidence that such is the case of MasterCard cross-border fees? The EC has not provided any, except for saying that the fees are not compatible with the existing EU statutes. My understanding of the matter is such that a policy of scrapping credit
card fees or mobile telephone roaming fees are hugely popular among the
general public, even though they are either ineffective or harmful. After
all, if the EC has been guided by a sincere concern for the welfare of
the Europeans, it would have found itself better ways of improving the
ways how European companies compete - it would have fought hard for the
liberalisation of services for instance. But one should not be surprised
or disappointed at seeing the EC behaving in this way. After all, the
Commission is but a bunch of self-seeking individuals, exposed to a particular
set of incentives generated by the political process. Competition Policy and the Theory of Second-Best
It should always be our first instinct to smell something fishy when governments step in market transactions to back private companies's loans. In the vast majority of cases, such interventions are indeed wasteful and serve few other purposes than politicians' re-election concerns. This being said, does it mean that the European Commission's control over state aid is desirable? From the perspective of economic theory, this is a tricky subject, because presence of competition-distorting state aid places us in an environment of the second-best. And in a second-best world, it is very difficult to perform welfare comparisons. Thus, even if we know that state aid is wasteful, it does not follow that state aid in the presence of supranational state aid control is always desirable. Some twenty years ago, Stiglitz and Sah had an interesting
paper in the AER, describing the effects of industrial policy. The
welfare implications of alternative modes of organising industrial policy
were largely ambiguous. Furthermore, when we take into consideration the
fact that the EC suffers from a number of public choice problems, the
case for consistent state aid control becomes extremely weak. Should we applaud the green jobs? It might be that the rise in global temperatures is just a statistical illusion. But it might be that the increase is real but that the costs of limiting it are greater than the costs of the climate change itself. Finally, it may well be the case that the increase is real and that policies limiting its extent are justified in the cost-benefit sense. Essentially, we cannot say in which case we find ourselves. Some people would argue that this uncertainty is not really an argument for doing nothing. Most libertarians would counter that, unless government action can be proven to bring greater benefits than costs, it should be avoided. However that may be, if the climate change is real, then it is only an exogenous occurrence which imposes costs on mankind. It is not something that should be welcomed. And neither should the policies aiming at curbing its effects be welcomed in their own right. If climate change is not a problem, then these policies will represent pure social waste. Their hypothetical justification as a necessary evil lies only in the possibility that climate change materializes. To try to find bright sides of these policies, other than remedying the alleged problem of global warming, is utterly fallacious. And yet it is precisely this consideration that the UN is ignoring. The environmental policies aiming at limiting global warming are supposed to create new green jobs and this is why we ought to rejoice ourselves. Even if we assume that the change is real, this "advantage" is no more an advantage than the fact that the hurricane Katrina has led to a boom of the construction industry in New Orleans area. The fact that people need to rebuild their homes or that they need to participate in various anti-warming businesses is a deplorable consequence of an exogenous disturbance, of a "negative technological shock" and not something which should be applauded. To say otherwise means to commit the broken window fallacy and to claim that we can be made richer and happier by destroying things and then incurring costs in repairing them, or by purchasing new ones. My contention is that the situation is even worse than that. I suspect
that the acclaimed "green jobs" are not a necessary evil, but that they
are an unnecessary, a pure social waste, distorting competition, creating
false incentives and producing myriad undesirable unintentional consequences. Price-fixing in the glass industry? Maybe, but...
It may be that these firms were just facing symmetric cost shocks which made them increase prices at the same time. But it may be that they were indeed engaged in coordinated action to assure themselves abnormal profits at the expense of consumers. In the latter case, the EC's intervention would come at the right moment and it would have the potential to boost welfare - both on the glass market and by sending a signal to other industries that price-ixing will not be tolerated. After all, not even economists of the Austrian School deny that government intervention can have some favourable consequences. But does the fact that the government sometimes gets it right justify
its involvement in general? Adam Smith was very sceptical about the possibility
of effective antitrust policy. In his era, governments were small and
weak. Now they have armies of bureaucrats to prepare their agenda and
to pursue it forcefully. Perhaps with enough secret agents sniffing around,
from time to time the Commission can succeed in identifying a cartel or
two. But is the EC's ability to find and destroy cartels worth the cost
of having a big and omnipotent Commission? I doubt it. Will ASEAN become the next EU? The ASEAN plan is not without its risks, however. Gains from trade and
liberalisation are potentially immense but it is important that the Asian
states do succumb to the temptation which has lead the EU structures to
become a supranational government living a life of its own and eventually
forgetting the initial goals of economic integration. It is also important
that the integration does not become a pretext for creating a common trading
bloc, raising new trade barriers with regard to the rest of the world.
This risk is particularly pronounced in the Asian context, as most of
the ASEAN countries have a long tradition of industrial policy and protectionism.
Let us hope that economic integration of South-eastern part of Asia will
not serve as a disguise for amplification of these unfortunate tendencies. Why there will not be free trade. At least not
anytime soon "If others have the right to protect themselves against dumping, why not Europe? If other nations put industrial policies in place, why not Europe? If others defend their farmers, why shouldn't Europe defend its farmers?"Existence of tariff protection, unlike the labour market rigidities and the welfare largesse, does not have immediate and significant repercussions on the welfare of Europeans. Dispersed costs and concentrated benefits such is the usual public choice explanation. This explanation, though, is not entirely accurate. Things are far worse than that. Given the dispersion of costs and their small size at the individual
level, many Europeans may find it pleasant to indulge in irrational ideas
about how beneficial it is to protect "our" farmers and workers, as opposed
to some socially distant and therefore unimportant farmers and workers
in China or in the Third World. The origins of this irrational desire
to oppose "us" and "them" in trade relationships seem to go deep into
our past. Perhaps that this tendency is determined by thousands of years
spent by our forefathers in small groups of hunters and gatherers for
whom the presence of strangers meant a threat and not an opportunity to
realise gains from trade. And if this is true, then the best outcome that
we can hope for is decreasing the extent of trade protectionism at the
margin, not getting rid of it altogether. Is the French consensus changing? In a recent article in Le Figaro, some of the most respected French economists Olivier Blanchard of MIT, Pierre Cahuc, Francis Kramarz and André Zylberberg of Ecole Polytechnique present a very sober analysis of the ways in which French welfare state has strangled all competition and flexibility on the market with labour. France is the only country in the world in which courts examine whether lay-offs in private companies are done only to maintain competitiveness and not to 'increase' it (which is considered illegal under current French statutes). Also, the obligation to offer a reassignment to every employee whom a company wishes to fire stifles the adjustment processes on the labour market. The price for 'saving' existing jobs at any cost is that creation of new jobs is discouraged and that French unemployment figures are among the least favourable in Europe. The authors of the article are no libertarians. The view which they
are presenting is view that most members of the economic profession would
consider standard and uncontroversial fare. Let us hope that it will make
its way into French legislation. Religion and Competition Modern economics, as well as the historical experience, seem to prove Smith right. Yet it is important to note that his is not at all an intuitive insight. The United States, for instance, is a religiously fractionalized country in which toleration has been the norm from the moment when the first religious fanatics landed in New England. Some countries with established and publicly funded moderate churches have experienced that the "consumers" of faith have become dissatisfied and have turned towards various forms of "ersatz-religions" or even towards sectarian violence. Thus it is often not so much the actual content of the religion which plays a role, as the institutional structure through which it is supplied. Surprising as it may sound, economics gives us tools to study production
of spiritual commodities much in the same way as we study production of
shoes or software. And in supply of religion, competition and free entry
represent the most desirable forms of industrial organization, just as
in most other sectors of the economy. Microsoft, durum wheat and unintended consequences
of public policy This week has brought us another fine example of unintended consequences
of public policy. Italian authorities have started
an investigation into the prices of pasta products, which are expected
to increase. The regulators suspect the existence of a wide-ranging conspiracy
of pasta makers against the general public, but the reality appears to
be far more trivial. Durum wheat prices are on the rise and one of the
reasons is that wheat is being increasingly used as a bio-fuel, apparently
as a result of various environmentally-oriented policy measures. Politicians
and regulators should finally grasp the fact that living in the world
of scarcity involves trade-offs. When wheat is used to produce bio-fuels,
it cannot be used simultaneously to make fettuccine. This observation
results not from a conspiracy of pasta or bio-fuel makers but simply from
the fact there are indeed no free lunches in this world of ours. Antitrust and the Wealth of Nations People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary. (I.10.82)Smith points here to two major things. The first one is that voluntary interaction can give birth to factions - coordinated groups of individuals pursuing their common interest, possibly at the expense of someone else. The second one is that public policy will be greatly inefficient at tackling this problem and that there few ways how this can be done in a legitimate way. What has modern economics added to these insights? Of course, neoclassical
apparatus enables us to distinguish between a fine variety of ways in
which the real world differs from the model of perfect competition, but
the essence remains the same. There are ways in which private individuals
can conspire, in some way or another, against the general public. And
there is basically nothing that public policy can do about it, unless
we adopt the crazy assumptions of its benevolence and omniscience. In
a fundamental sense, economists have gone a very long way only to reaffirm
the wisdom of Adam Smith. Outsourcing, Central European Edition It might seem that outsourcing consists simply of relocating call centres from the West to Bangalore. Yet the practice of outsourcing is far more sophisticated than that. I was particularly amazed to see how the same or very closely related tasks are often subdivided as in Adam Smith's pin factory among workers situated on different continents. This Prague Post article brings interesting evidence on how outsourcing of accounting services is being performed simultaneously in India and in the Czech Republic: At its Prague outsourcing center, Accenture digitizes 25,000 invoices and receipts every month for an unnamed customer, a financial institution. The scanned images are archived and then sent to India, where office workers enter the data manually into the bank's computer system.Intriguing as this form of division of labour may be, we should bear in mind that it is likely to be subject to various regulatory threats resulting most probably out of the fashionable concern about "data privacy." It is therefore crucial that we are able to explain to the median voter that this apparently suspicious and unintelligible activity is highly desirable and beneficial. feedback permalink Postal market liberalisation and the non-issues
This is certainly not good news. Postal services liberalisation has been an issue since late 1990s and it is a shame that a mixture of vested interests and populism has prevented any conclusive decision from being taken. In light of the striking failure to open many sectors to free competition, one has to wonder what DG Competition is doing instead. What is more important than pushing for free movement of services and labour across Europe and for liberalisation of government-run postal services and railways? Apparently, bullying private firms is a more urgent task. This unfortunate habit of the EC seems to have gone so far that nowadays the concerned firms denounce themselves so as to avoid harsh punishments. Most recently, Google has asked for the commision's approval of its purchase of DoubleClick. Is it not strange that a takeover which has no particularly European feature ought to be approved by European Commission? Sure, this is not so much an issue of restraining competition, but rather one of privacy and whether the outcome will be reconcilable with European statutes on internet privacy. But let me say it loudly: The privacy problem is a non-issue; people give their personal information willingly and they will give it willingly to anyone they trust. It is interesting to note that this business was thriving without many formal enforcement mechanisms simply on the basis of trust for quite some time it has been only in past few years that politicians have identified the "problem" of privacy and have used it as grounds for further intervention. My take on this topic is clear the commssion should focus less
on non-issues and private transactions and more on the burdensome and
annoying features of the Common Market, still plagued by heavy regulation
and trade barriers of varied character. Google, the Lunar Prize and Optimal Funding of R&D Still, under high levels of uncertainty and liquidity constraints, prizes
may not be a feasible option. Without an upfront grant, I would not be
able to fund my spaceship project as no sensible banker would make such
a loan. Also, giving prizes should lead us to ask what the optimal size
of the prize is. If the prize is too small, not enough effort will be
developed and if it is too large, more research than appropriate will
be undertaken. In the first case, no entrepreneur will send a space ship
to the Moon. In the second, more than one craft will land there. In any
event, Tyler Cowen discusses these and other issues here,
in a very nice address to the staff of the Google Corporation. EC v. Microsoft, Season Finale (?) First of all, this decision is not surprising. Should the Court have ruled against the EC, this would put the Commission in great embarrassment given that it has been occupied the issue for such a long time. I am not saying that the Court succumbed to political pressures; I just think that we cannot completely ignore incentives that the judges were facing. Second, there is not much new to discuss about the decision itself, for it basically reaffirmed the previous rulings of the Commission which have been extensively commented upon at this website and elsewhere. Let us thus focus on what appears to be the main issue here: the interoperability, as they call it. It is claimed that the design of Microsoft's operating system is such that it prevents competitors from realistically supplying rival software to compete with the Media Player or other applications. This claim comes in two forms: The crude form says that the origin of the problem is that Microsoft offers some of these applications as a part of Windows, therefore disabling any competition. True enough, but who loses from such situation, except for producers of rival software? If this is the crux of the matter, what prevents the producers of alternative software applications from supplying the product to those customers who cannot live with the imperfections of the Media Player? The subtler version of the claim says that the Windows is designed in
such a wicked way that it actually technically prevents the alternative
software applications from working correctly under Windows. Even under
superficial scrutiny, this does not hold. After all, we do observe these
alternative Media Players, word processors and so forth working in Windows.
But even if there is some barrier to correct functioning of such software,
is it reasonable to try to impose something different through government
regulation? I claim that it is not. For one thing, no one has ever cogently
shown how much such increased interoperability would cost us. And yes,
costs to Microsoft should count as everyone else's. Competition and Corruption The paper tells the stories of three industries of very different degrees of competition: whiskey distilling (very high degree), oil refining (moderate degree) and public utilities (low degree). Over its history, competition and free entry into the whiskey distilling industry have destroyed all attempts to create rents. In the case of the oil-refining industries, there were attempts to buy legislative and regulatory favours but these were usually short-lived. And the utility sector has appeared to follow the worst scenario of rent-seeking and corruption. Troesken argues that the underlying cause of this is the fact that capital deployed in the utility industry cannot be transferred elsewhere and that unlike in the oil-refining industry technological diffusion is quite slow. His is an interesting account of corruption. Now, the true challenge
is to understand competition not as an exogenous variable, but as something
which emerges from the technological characteristics and rate of technological
change and also from the interaction between the private and public spheres.
Without this understanding, we will be just left to wonder over the striking
differences between the organization of different industries and the fact
that highly competitive sectors, independent of any government favours,
live side by side with monopolised industries, closely connected to the
government and benefiting from its regulation. The Commission, the Church and the "Lenin Shipyard" As for the first issue, the Gdansk shipyard has been the recipient of massive aid from the Polish government. Some of the Poles simply dislike the idea that the place where Solidarity was born ought to be closed or fundamentally restructured. This is silly. People fought for their freedom in all kinds of strange places. In many nonsensical factories and bureaus people expressed their disagreement with the communist regime. These people should be honoured but I do not think that there is any reason why the factories and bureaus in question be kept for their original purposes. But, anyhow, this is a Polish matter. If Polish taxpayers want to keep the former "Lenin Shipyard" alive for some nostalgic purpose, let them do it. With regard to the second issue, the EC has started questioning the Italian government over tax exemptions for the Catholic Church. Apparently, these represent state aid and are incompatible with the functioning of the Common Market (most probably they distort competition on the market for salvation). My answer tends to be the same as in the previous case: If Italians are willing to exempt the Church from tax liability in the same manner as not-for-profit organisations are, let them do it. Again, this is no issue of European interest. All these small cases generate suspicion about the purposefulness of
the EC's work. There would be nothing wrong with it if such suspicion
were fully justified. At the same time, they may generate hostility against
the very idea of the Common Market. For some Poles and Italians, competition
and open markets may have just become abstract notions which had been
used by evil foreigners to insult the symbols of their national and religious
pride. Lou Dobbs and the free movement of labour I believe that this video excerpt is very instructive for Europeans
as well. The European Union was created, among other things, to ensure
free movement of labour. Fifty years later, there still exists a sizeable
group of member countries whose citizens cannot freely seek employment
in large parts of the Union. I can imagine that this status quo is being
defended in France and Germany with the same demagoguery and lack of wit
as shown by Mr Dobbs. But when it comes to immigration and movement of
labour within the EU, the truth is that we will not find any of the relatively
difficult issues which can make open borders policy problematic. Poles,
Czechs and Slovaks do not come to the UK and Ireland to free ride on local
social services. They do not form ghettos and they do not preach any ideology
of racial or religious hatred. They simply come to work. The fact that
they cannot come to work to Germany or France under the same conditions
is a monument erected to the stupidity of the European likes of Mr Dobbs. Do not play games with protectionism, please One must say that there might exist a risk related to foreign governments' buying specific European companies. Imagine for instance, an obscure Al Qaeda/Kremlin-run investment fund buying some major defense company. I cannot say that such risk is nonexistent. On the other hand, Mr Mandelson's proposal is not innocuous either, and I would bet that the risks related to European governments' managing foreign investment are far greater than the conspiracy theory according to which all corrupt and nasty regimes are raising money to buy the jewels of European industry. There can be no discussion about the fact that if such a measure was
adopted, even with EC oversight, this would mean a massive rise of protectionism
in countries such as France, which already suffer from a strong anti-foreign
bias. Until now, the EU has played largely a positive role in mitigating
the protectionism of national governments. Making the "golden shares"
an official doctrine means abandoning this role. Furthermore, by introducing
shared competence between the EC and national governments on this issue,
it is inevitable that the European Union becomes an accomplice in the
game of particular interests and nationalism. And as such, I would have
troubles relying on its oversight directed at limiting the extent of the
"golden shares" to truly strategic companies. "Every country should have a minimum wage" If there is one issue on which there should be a quasi-universal agreement among economists (although for some reason which I do not quite understand, there is not), then it is the issue of minimum wage. The controversial Card and Krueger study notwithstanding, it is very difficult to find reasons supporting the idea that minimum wages are a good thing. In the better case, minimum wage is ineffective, in the worse case it reduces employment of the least productive and the most vulnerable individuals. It is fortunate that in most countries the minimum wage is set sufficiently low so as not to be a major economic problem. But this does not make it a good thing and there is absolutely no reason why European countries which do not have minimum wage laws should adopt them. Here is Greg
Mankiw's older piece on the issue. I bet that Mr Almunia has not read
it. Nicolas Sarkozy against "free and undistorted competition" Although, in many respects the political agreement over the new treaty seems to be a reasonable compromise and is probably far less intrusive than Giscard d'Estaing's original Constitution there is one disturbing thing about it. Following the pressure by Nicolas Sarkozy, European leaders have dropped the commitment to "free and undistorted competition" from the text of the treaty. It's only a detail,yet a detail with strong symbolic meaning. If there is one praiseworthy feature of European integration, it is the fact that it has, by and large, opened barriers to trade and movement of capital and labour. We are now in a situation when some of the original goals that motivated the creation of European Communities are still unfulfilled: Eastern newcomers are not free to offer their labour in the old EU countries and services cannot move freely across countries. And if there is one pressing issue of truly European interest, then it is that Europeans have these two freedoms and that Europe becomes a place of free and undistorted competition. A correct understanding of economic integration is one from which the
word "competition" is inseparable. Economic integration is competition.
And now it appears more clearly than ever that European
leaders use economic integration only as a pretext for their ambitious
political goals. It is saddening that these efforts have been led by Mr
Sarkozy who has been considered by many (including yours truly here)
as a source of hope for France. To paraphrase Jean
Giraudoux, the return to individual liberty will not take place. Not
this time, not in France. When will postal services be liberalised? This is bad news, especially given the time that has already been spent on the efforts to liberalise. But let us have a brief look at the arguments proposed by those who oppose the liberalisation. I believe that these are basically of two kinds. The first is that liberalisation will hurt and that a number of employees of the current monopoly companies will have to leave. This is true: every liberalisation hurts someone. But still, it can be shown easily that in spite of these temporary costs related to relocation of labour across sectors, liberalisation is a very good deal. The second argument pertains to what seems to be the more difficult issue with liberalisation. In every country, postal service guarantees the so-called universal service – collection and delivery of mail five times a week at the same rate for all citizens, no matter whether they live in a city centre or in a remote mountain village. Liberalising the postal market could endanger existence of this universal service, as new entrants could simply compete on the market with business deliveries within cities while the incumbent company would still have to deliver less profitable services to customers in rural areas. This is a fair concern and I must say that, in a fully liberalised market, universal service would have to go. It is absurd that the price of a basic letter is the same, no matter whether I am sending it from Prague to a recipient in Prague or whether I am sending it from Horní Lhota in the Silesia to Mokrosuky in the Southern Bohemia. In this sense, universal service is unfair and inefficient. One could say that no one should suffer by the liberalisation, regardless
of where he lives. The truth is that maybe not even the citizens of remote
villages would suffer from having a fully liberalised postal market and
having to pay the full price of postal services. They would definitely
end up paying more than those who live and send their letters to large
cities, but still they may pay less than they do today. This is because
monopoly postal service providers suffer from a terrible amount of X-inefficiency,
overemployment and rigidity. In a free market, under competition and without
state aid, companies would be more and more incited to invent new, less
costly and more rapid ways of delivery and, from my perspective, there
is nothing significant to worry about. State aid control is hypocritical and dysfunctional What does this mean for our understanding of such a practical issue as the state aid control? Obviously, there are two ways of approaching this question: First, we may look at it as a game theoretical problem taking place between vote-seeking politicians and the European regulators. In this case, a case can be made in favour of state aid control, although I think that it will be only very weak. However, if we adopt an emergent-based approach towards thinking about these matters, most of the welfare conclusions about state aid control will go down the drain. State aid control will be a space in which bureaucrats, politicians and interest groups will make their mutually beneficial deals, producing a mixture of results with no particular welfare characteristics. And my impression is that this is exactly what we observe. Sometimes, one is compelled to welcome the EC's stepping in, sometimes the intervention seems preposterous. But most importantly, there appears to me that what was once designed as a strict rule to follow is now decomposing into a complex system of exceptions and political considerations. State aid that does not affect competition on the common market is usually allowed. Even if competition is affected by aid, it can still be justified on social grounds or in the name of some broad "public interest." In the end, most of national governments' wasteful spending goes on unpunished and the EC focuses on rather small cases in which the stakes of the national politicians are low. As a result, state aid control is largely dysfunctional. For instance, when we see European governments spending huge amounts of money of subsidizing film production, the EC does nothing and just asserts, as Neelie Kroes recently did, that: "Our aim is to ensure that state aid control continues to ensure optimal and equal conditions for artistic and cultural creation."This is not say that film industry subsidies are a major problem for European economies. They are not. But the EC's stand on this issue appears as completely at odds with its bold and defiant position on other, often less important, issues. This may be a conscious strategy pursued by Ms Kroes - to create impression of a guardian of the public purse and European competition when this is easy and to be inactive when political costs of stepping in are high. In any case, the degree of ambiguity and arbitrariness of EC's decisions on state aid signals that something rotten is emerging out of it. feedback permalink Free internet connection in Prague? Not quite. "state subsidies for such networks are only acceptable if they address a well-defined market failure or cohesion problem." So far so good. One may have hoped that the intervention would save Czech taxpayers some Euros (or Crowns). But the municipality of Prague modified the project in a way that made it acceptable for the Commission: namely it stipulated that the broadband network will allow access only to websites of public institutions. There will be therefore a € 12 million wireless network that will allow the Czechs to visit websites such as this one or this one. It is true that such a network will not affect competition among Prague
internet access providers. In this sense, there will be no ground for
the EC’s stepping in. But is the project not going to be a colossal waste
of public money? A network that would provide free internet access would
destroy competition in the sector, but at least people in Prague would
have free internet. A network that will provide access only to public
sector websites will not affect competition at all, but I can guarantee
that it will be of no use to anyone. I cannot defend either of these projects
but I can’t see the latter as being any better than the former. Sensible
policy would allow neither (or both) of them. Is "ownership unbundling" a panacea? Unbundling may be a good idea. But it is a good idea only when the government enjoys the luxury of privatising a previously state-owned company. Such was the case in some of the transition economies in which the distribution facilities were sold to a different company than the ones that bought the power plants. But is it sensible to speak about unbundling in a context in which some of the companies in question are privately owned? Yet this is precisely what Mr Heitzer does - the new legislation against mergers in the sector will clearly interfere with the principles of private ownership. Sure, competition in the energy sector is far from perfect. How could it be perfect, after fifty years of jealous subsidisation of national champions? Market structure is very different from what it would have been without the infamous industrial policies of the fifties and sixties. Adjustment to a more free-market environment is slow and costly. But what can politicians and regulators do about it? Surely the least advisable thing is to step in again with some rather dubious policies. More importantly, the approach chosen by Mr Heitzer reflects a purely
technical understanding of competition. Market shares and concentrations
are what bother him the most. But these are of no importance in themselves.
A contestable monopoly can be as welfare-maximising as perfect competition.
At most, too concentrated a market can be a symptom of an underlying failure,
but my bet is that the failure is one of the government and not of the
market itself. Therefore, to put in place costly policies only to decrease
the concentrations and reduce market shares of the leading companies is
very unlikely to benefit anyone at all. Should Consumer Credit Be Harmonised? It is certainly good to remove existing obstacles to cross-border competition
in this area, but I fear that the new consumer credit directive is fundamentally
flawed. To have genuine competition, it is not necessary to have unified
legislation over consumer credit. It would be preferable to allow competition
- even among various institutional settings - to flourish and not to "standardise"
an area in which Even the German Justice Minister, who presided over the EU Council, said: "Of course, most consumers will enter credit agreements with nearby banks, or at least banks in their own country."This is very true and I think that it much weakens the case for harmonisation. If no one is going to compare terms and conditions of personal loans in Slovakia and in the UK to get the best deal, then why impose common regulatory mechanisms guiding the credit business in both countries? Of course, there may be cases when individuals are interested in comparing loans available to them in more than just one country but, realistically speaking, these are cases when the customer will compare loans in no more than two or three countries. In such circumstances, different regulatory systems in the countries concerned create only an infinitesimal obstacle to one's ability to reach a sensible decision. On the whole, I find the case for harmonisation to be very weak. Furthermore,
the harmonisation is far from being risk-free, as the directive may leave
European countries stuck with "standardised" Who competes with Madame Tussaud's? It seems to me that there are market activities that are so specific
by nature of the goods provided that approaching them in terms of standard
microeconomic theory of industrial organisation is problematic. This can
be illustrated precisely on the example of amusement facilities: in fact,
competition among various providers of amusement parks is much less important
than competition among any given amusement site and providers of close
substitutes in its vicinity. A potential visitor of Madame Tussaud's in
London will probably not consider prices and quality of Legoland in Copenhagen
or EuroDisney in Paris but rather his London options - going to the theatre,
to the cinema, for a dinner or just strolling through a park. Real competition
is thus not taking place in some "European amusement facilities" sector
- which is therefore a completely artificial construct - but rather among
very heterogeneous goods provided by suppliers who would never think that
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